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The United States Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior' Court
of California' announced that personal service of process on a non-
resident individual who is temporarily in the state subjects the individual
to jurisdiction even though the suit is unrelated to the individual's
activities in the state.
The California litigation was a divorce action by Mrs. Burnham
against her husband. They had married in West Virginia, moved to New
Jersey, had two children, and in 1987 decided to separate, agreeing that
Mrs. Burnham would move to California and take custody of the
children.
Mrs. Burnham brought suit for divorce in California in 1988. Shortly
thereafter the husband visited southern California on business and then
went north to visit his children, who resided with his wife. After visiting
with one child for the weekend, upon returning the child to his home,
he was served with a California court summons in Mrs. Burnham's
divorce action. The husband returned to New Jersey and later made a
special appearance in the California court to quash the service of process
on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him
because of insufficient contacts. The California court upheld jurisdiction
and application for certiorari was made to the United States Supreme
Court, which accepted the case for review.
The Court pronounced a blunt and simple statement in its conclusion,
that an individual personally present in a jurisdiction may be served
with process on any matter. (The Court expressly disavowed any state-
ment as to the application of this rule to corporations. 2) In reaching
that conclusion, the opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, examined the
concept of personal jurisdiction from the very beginning of time through
the current Supreme Court edicts. The Court reaffirmed that the standard
set out in International Shoe v. Washington3 is still the dominant ju-
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risdictional standard: jurisdiction must be consistent with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Having already pointed out
that the most fundamental and ancient basis for jurisdiction was the
physical presence of the defendant within the power of the court, Justice
Scalia observed that under International Shoe, "the defendant's litiga-
tion-related 'minimum contacts' may take the place of physical presence
as the basis for jurisdiction .... ",4 The opinion emphasizes that the
minimum contacts requirement for jurisdiction over absent defendants
has been so prominent in the jurisprudence that attention has waned
on the jurisdictional effect of a' defendant's physical presence in the
forum. The Court thus concluded its theme that the widespread practice
of finding jurisdiction on physical presence alone runs from ancient
times to the present in an unbroken fashion, so that one must say that
literally it is traditional, in the sense of long-standing, and that it must
represent fair play because so many jurisdictions follow the rule.
In rebuttal of petitioner's argument that Shaffer v. Heitner requires
a connection between a defendant's minimum contacts and the litigation,
the court said that the distinction lay in the fact that Shaffer involved
an absent defendant and "stands for nothing more than the proposition
that when the 'minimum contact' that is a substitute for physical presence
consists of property ownership, it must, like other minimum contacts,
be related to the litigation." '6
A very interesting feature of the opinion is Justice Scalia's feisty
attack upon the views of Justice Brennan. In the majority opinion itself,
Justice Scalia devoted substantial space in a tone approaching derisive-
ness. He referred to Justice Brennan's proposal as a "seductive standard ' 7
without authority to be found in any of the court's personal jurisdiction
cases. He further refered to the approach as one of "subjectivity, and
hence inadequacy." ' The tone of the opinion at this point is that the
Justice was simply continuing an in-chambers argument with his col-
league. His concluding shot was that "[tihe difference between us and
Justice Brennan has nothing to do with whether 'further progress [is]
to be made' in the 'evolution of our legal system.' It has to do with
whether changes are to be adopted as progressive by the American
people or decreed as progressive by the Justices of this Court. Nothing
we say today prevents individual States from limiting or entirely aban-
doning the in-state-service basis of jurisdiction." 9
4. Burnam, 110 S. Ct. at 2114.
5. 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
6. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
7. Id. at 2117.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2119 (citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia's final volley is found in footnote five of the opinion,
in which he characterized Justice Brennan's view, in one particular aspect,
as "imperious."' 10
In summary, the opinion appears to allow a state court the freedom
to base personal jurisdiction on any matter over an individual person
solely upon service of process within the state's boundaries, the state
presumably still having the discretion and power to decline to entertain
purely transitory litigation. Corporations were expressly excepted from
this opinion. "
In Fox v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University,12 the
First Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana held that Louisiana lacks
sufficient contacts to assert in personam jurisdiction over a Minnesota
college whose student was injured in a rugby match in Louisiana. The
court found that the rugby team was an informal one, not sponsored
by the college, so that the conduct or presence of the team was not in
any way the conduct or presence of the college itself and could not
support personal jurisdiction over the college.
In an interesting concomitant point regarding the insurance company
of the college, the court found that while the insurance company did
such substantial business in Louisiana that it could be said that Louisiana
had jurisdiction over the company as such, the state would nevertheless
decline to exercise that jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non-
conveniens. The alleged acts of wrongdoing, said the court, were as to
the management and training of the team and had occurred in Minnesota,
not in Louisiana.
In Socorro v. Orleans Levee Board,3 Angelina Casualty Company
was sued in its capacity as the liability insurer of the City of New
Orleans. The name of the company was unknown at time of suit, so
plaintiff used the nomenclature "DEF Insurance Company" in naming
Angelina as a defendant. Angelina was never served, but plaintiff asserted
that Angelina nevertheless submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court
by filing a motion for summary judgment, thus making a general ap-
pearance under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 7.
The court properly ruled that since Angelina had never been served,
it was not a "party" within the meaning of Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 7, and its filing of a motion for summary judgment
did not constitute such pleading within the contemplation of Article 7
as is required to constitute a general appearance, because Article 7
applies only to parties.
10. Id. at n.5.
11. Id. at 2110 n.l.
12. 559 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted, 565 So. 2d 930 (1990).
13. 561 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
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Prescription
Despite the apparent liberality of supreme court jurisprudence 4 as
to the "relating back" effect of amended petitions adding parties, whether
plaintiff or defendant, the courts of appeal frequently maintain the
exception of prescription as to the late-added party on finding that the
defendant was not sufficiently on notice during the prescriptive period.
Two cases to this effect, as to the defendants, are Heimann v. General
Cinema Corporation of Louisiana 5 and Hernandez v. Plaquemines Par-
ish School Board.'6
As to the late-added plaintiff, Farber, M.D. v. United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Insurance Company7 held that the claim by an injured.
physician for his loss of income was prescribed because his income had
been assigned to a professional corporation and the original, timely-
filed suit, was in the name of the individual physician only. When his
right to sue for loss of income was questioned, the professional cor-
poration was added as a party plaintiff, but it was after the prescriptive
period and the court found that the defendant was not in any way on
notice that this plaintiff would come forward; thus the claim was found
prescribed."
Pleading As Notice
In T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Kenner Landing, Inc.,19 the.Louisiana
Supreme Court refused to allow the plaintiff to collect damages under
the rule of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 862, which provides
that the court can grant any relief just and proper on the pleadings.
The court found that because the principal suit was for injunction, the
defendant was not' on notice that he was facing and defending a claim
for damages, so that his defense was seriously prejudiced.
14. Giroir v. South La. Medical Ctr., Div. of Hosps., 475 So. 2d 1040 (La. 1985);
Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1983).
15. 559 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
16. 563 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
17. 561 So. 2d 951 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
18. Compare Farber, id., with Giroir v. South La. Medical Ctr, Div. of Hosps., 475
So. 2d 1040 (La. 1985) on the issue of notice.
19. 562 So. 2d 914 (La. 1990).
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